University of Mississippi

eGrove
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

2018

Creating Divergence: Examining The Development Of Creativity
Through Executive Function, Language And Mindset
Brittany Nielsen Avila
University of Mississippi

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd
Part of the Developmental Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Avila, Brittany Nielsen, "Creating Divergence: Examining The Development Of Creativity Through Executive
Function, Language And Mindset" (2018). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1147.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/1147

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at eGrove. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

CREATING DIVERGENCE: EXAMINING THE DEVELOPMENT OF CREATIVITY
THROUGH LANGUAGE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION AND MINDSET

A Dissertation
presented in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Psychology
The University of Mississippi

by
BRITTANY NIELSEN AVILA
May 2018

Copyright © 2018 by Brittany N. Avila
All rights reserved.

ABSTRACT
Creativity is a multifaceted construct influenced by task constraints (Glucksberg &
Wesiberg, 1966; Runco, 1986), cognitive processes (Bijvoet-van den Berg, & Hoicka, 2014;
Claxton, Pannells, & Rhoads, 2005) and motivational factors (Dweck, 2006; Lucas & Nordgren,
2015), and is hypothesized to have significant “slumps” where the development slows, such as
the “fourth-grade slump” (Torrance, 1967; 1968). The purpose of the present study was to
examine the hypothesized “fourth-grade slump” in creativity and determine whether cognitive
factors, such as executive function (i.e., cognitive control, Zelazo, Muller, Frye & Marcovitch,
2003), motivation factors (i.e., mindset and persistence), and situational factors (i.e., language
used within a task) would interact with age to show different patterns of influence during
different times of development. Although there was not a fourth-grade slump, we did find
differences between children and adults where children had lower creativity but showed links to
EF abilities in working memory. People at all age groups undervalued their persistence in a
creative task and mindset was not related to creative ability. Taken together, these results
indicate that children utilize cognitive factors such as EF when performing a creative task and as
people age they rely less on cognitive factors, but have overall higher levels of creativity and all
age groups undervalue the role of persistence in creative tasks.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

To find creativity in the world (i.e., works that are both novel and useful, Sternberg &
Lubart, 1999) one does not need to look far. The computer you are likely using to read this was
once just a creative idea far from being realized. Though creative works are ubiquitous today
(i.e., cellphones, computers, endless applications for those devices and great works of art such as
novels, paintings, and even movies), understanding creative development and the factors that
influence creativity remains elusive. Creativity is thought to emerge as early as 2 years of age
(Bijvoet-van den Berg & Hoicka, 2014; Hoicka, Bijvoet-van den Berg, Kerr, & Carberry, 2013)
and increases until fourth grade when we see a sharp decline in creative achievement known as
the fourth-grade slump (Claxton et al., 2005; Kim, 2011; Nash, 1974; Torrance, 1968). Few
studies have examined underlying causes of this decline, though researchers have suggested the
fourth-grade slump is caused by a change in the language and instructions used in the classroom
as well as an increase in cognitive ability (Runco, 1986; Torrance, 1968). The current study
examined how changes to language used within a creativity task influenced creative responses
across the lifespan at first grade, fourth grade, and adulthood. Further, I explored how individual
differences in cognition (e.g., using executive functions to hold more than one idea in mind at
once) and motivation (e.g., believing that your creative ability can improve through hard work)
related to creativity and the use of language in creative tasks. Through language and individual
difference variables we can gain a better understanding of the development of creativity across
the lifespan.
1

Theories of Creativity
Most theorists agree that creativity is defined as an ability to produce work that is both
novel and useful (Albert & Runco, 1999; Guilford, 1950; Runco, 1986; Sternberg & Lubart,
1999). For example, the invention of the personal computer can be considered a creative work
because it was a unique addition to technology that has proven to be useful, with most people
unable to go a day without using one. One of the major theories of creativity is the investment
theory proposed by Sternberg and Lubart (1995) who suggested that creative people “buy low
and sell high” like good investors do. According to their theory, a creative individual will first
generate ideas that are unpopular, buying low (e.g., the personal computer was met with
skepticism and criticism because a home computer was not seen as necessary or useful). Second,
creative people will attempt to convince other people that their ideas have worth (e.g.,
advertising the need for a computer at home). Lastly, they sell high letting other people pursue
their ideas while they move on to the next unpopular idea (e.g., cell phones or laptops, Sternberg
& Lubart, 1995; Sternberg & O’Hara, 1999). Creativity production has been suggested by many
to operate in this fashion, with creative individuals finding an unexplored area where they can
invest low and explore potentially unpopular ideas that will yield a large payoff if they can
convince others of their need.
Within the investment theory, Sternberg and Lubart (1995) propose six personal factors
needed for creative achievement. The first, intelligence, has three aspects associated with
creativity: (1) synthetic ability – the ability to generate ideas that are novel and high in quality,
(2) analytical ability – the ability to judge the value of one’s own ideas and whether they are
worth pursuing, and (3) practical ability – the ability to apply intellectual skills to everyday
2

situations (Sternberg & O’Hara, 1999). All three of these aspects are important for creative
achievement. For example, someone may be very good at thinking of new and unique ideas (i.e.,
synthetic ability), but may lack the ability to determine which of those ideas are worth pursuing
and which are not (analytical ability) and thus may spend too much time devoted to unworthy
ideas. Or they may lack practical abilities like being able to communicate their ideas to others.
The second factor from the investment theory is knowledge. To achieve creatively one must have
knowledge of what already exists and what people think about or their conventional notions
(Sternberg & Lubart, 1995). A creative product must be unique and thus to create it, one needs to
know whether that product already exists or has been attempted before. Yet the authors also
caution that too much knowledge can hinder creative productivity. For example, knowing about
an object’s original purpose can lead to declines in new and unique ways of viewing that item,
known as functional fixedness (Adamson, 1952). Third, thinking styles are important to creative
achievement. Thinking styles are ways in which people prefer to apply their knowledge and
intelligence to a given problem. (Sternberg & Lubart, 1995; Sternberg, 1988). For example, a
person may have a “legislative style” in which they prefer to handle tasks in their own way or an
“executive style” where someone prefers a task specifically defined for them (Sternberg &
Lubart, 1995). The fourth factor is personality. To achieve creatively a person must be willing to
take risks and go against the status quo when buying low on an unpopular idea. Further, they
must be courageous enough to stand up to people who believe the idea to be unnecessary or
unworthy. The fifth factor is motivation. A creative person needs both intrinsic motivation (i.e.,
personal desire or self-expression) and extrinsic motivation (i.e., money or power) in order to
concentrate on the task (Sternberg & Lubart, 1995). Lastly, a person needs the right
3

environmental context. A person can have all other five aspects for creativity, but be in an
environment that does not allow creative ideas (e.g., a classroom where the teacher discourages
new or unique ideas).
Creativity Measurement. The study of creativity began by measuring eminent artists or
scientists such as Picaso or Einstein. These people were hard to come by though and many
researchers studied them posthumously making inferences difficult (Sternberg & Lubart 1999).
Studying only famous creative individuals, and posthumously at that, limited the study of
creativity according to Guilford (1950) by not allowing a full view of how creativity can interact
in everyday situations. Therefore, Guilford proposed the use of a more psychometric approach
involving tasks that could be quantified much like the IQ tests for intelligence and created
several paper-and-pencil tasks including the Unusual Uses Task (also known as the Alternative
Uses Task), where a person identifies as many uses for a common object (e.g., a brick) as they
can (Guilford, 1975), allowing creativity to be exhibited by any person at any time. The scoring
for this task is based on several factors that Guilford identified as being involved in creativity.
The first factor, sensitivity to problems, is the ability to recognize that a problem exists. In the
Alternative Uses Task example, this would represent knowing that we need to use a brick for a
unique reason such as using it to hold a door open while we bring in groceries. Sensitivity to
problems utilizes the analytic abilities described by Sternberg and Lubart (1995) where someone
must recognize a problem and judge whether their own ideas to solving the problem are useful.
The second factor is fluency, or the number of ideas generated. Someone scoring high on fluency
would generate multiple unique ideas to use a brick. The third is flexibility or shifting
approaches. To score high on flexibility each of the unique ideas generated needs to be in a
4

different category. For example, using the brick as a doorstop would be in a different category
than using it as a weapon. However, using the brick to hit your sister would be in the same
category as using it as a weapon. Flexibility utilizes Sternberg and Lubart’s (1995) practical
ability of applying creative solutions to everyday situations. Specifically, to be considered
flexible a person must switch between possible uses (situations) for each item. The last factor is
originality or determining whether a use for an item is novel (e.g., synthetic abilities, Sternberg
& Lubart, 1995). Using the brick to hold a Barbie funeral would be considered more original
than using it as a weapon (Guilford, 1975). Other measures were developed drawing off of
Guilford’s concepts of creativity (Houtz & Krug, 1995; Kim, 2011; for a review see Zeng,
Proctor & Salvendy, 2011) with the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT, Torrance,
1974) as perhaps the most popular method. The TTCT consists of two parts: a verbal scale where
people are asked to generate numerous ideas to problems posed (e.g., stating different ways to
use a conventional object such as a brick), and a figural scale where people actually produce
creative works (e.g., completing a drawing). With this suggestion of using psychometric
measures, the field took off in studying creativity psychometrically looking at what is known as
divergent thinking, the ability to produce many unique solutions to a single problem as opposed
to convergent thinking where one answer is required of the problem (Bijvoet-van den Berg, &
Hoicka, 2014; Claxton, Pannells, & Rhoads, 2005; Roskos-Ewoldsen, Black, & Mccown, 2008;
Runco, 1999).
As the field of creativity shifted to understanding psychometric measures of creativity,
individuals began to question the extent that measuring divergent thinking accurately assessed
creativity. Whereas creativity is the ability to produce something that is both novel and useful
5

(Sternberg & Lubart, 1999), divergent thinking is the ability to produce multiple unique solutions
to a single problem (Runco, 1999). Thus, divergent thinking may be thought to be a portion of
creativity as it measures unique and novel ideas, but does not inherently capture what is useful.
Although some researchers still believe that the best way to measure creativity is to use actual
creative works that have shown to be useful in society (i.e., popular novels or works of art;
Charles & Runco, 2001; Kim, 2011; Zeng, Proctor, & Salvendy, 2011), the majority of
researchers use divergent thinking to better understand creativity due to the difficulties acquiring
and measuring creative works (Bijvoet-van den Berg, & Hoicka, 2014; Charles & Runco, 2001;
Claxton, Pannells, & Rhoads, 2005; Kim, 2011; Roskos-Ewoldsen, Black, & Mccown, 2008;
Runco, 1999; Sternberg & Lubart, 1995; 1999; Sternberg & O’Hara, 1999). Divergent thinking
tests also have an advantage over achievement-oriented measures in that it does not penalize for
lack of expertise of productivity making it especially useful with children (Charles & Runco,
2001).
Development of Creativity. Research on divergent thinking has been conducted
throughout the lifespan and this aspect of creativity has been found to emerge around 2 years of
age (Bijvoet-van den Berg, & Hoicka, 2014) and increase thereafter with specific “slumps”
during childhood and adolescence (Barbot, Lubart, & Besancon, 2016). Torrance (1967; 1968)
described marked declines in creativity at three different time periods throughout life. The first
slump occurs around preschool at about age 5. The next decline occurs around age nine, known
colloquially in literature as the fourth-grade slump and the final slump occurs in adolescence
around age 12 and then the development begins to level off in a slow decline until late adulthood
(Torrance, 1967; 1968). However, there is disagreement on when exactly these slumps occur.
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For example, Kim (2011) suggested that rather than a fourth-grade slump, the major decline
occurs in the sixth grade, Charles and Runco (2011) suggested a peak in fourth grade rather than
a slump, and Claxton, Pannells, and Rhoads (2005) found no significant decreases in creativity
from fourth to ninth grade (except an increase in elaboration ability from sixth to ninth grade).
The curvilinear nature of creativity is consistent with developmental theories (Charles & Runco,
2001) that suggest sharp increases and declines in creativity throughout the lifespan. Though the
exact age at which the slumps occur is being debated, the fourth-grade slump was one of the first
discovered and therefore has become the most studied decline (Barbot et al., 2016).
Explanations given for the various slumps tend to focus on an increase in convergent
thinking (i.e., finding the single best answer to a problem or question; Cropley, 2006). For
example, Kim (2011) argued that children’s ability to produce multiple ideas (fluency) decreases
around fourth grade due to children becoming more concerned with representational accuracy
than with creative output. For example, children may be more concerned with guessing the use
for the object considered most correct by others (i.e., they would want to say that a brick was
used to build a house, because that is what most people would think). Charles and Runco (2001)
also suggest that creativity declines as children begin to understand which ideas other children
would think of and which are appropriate; suggesting that if convergent thinking is valued by
others it will be preferred to divergent thinking in children. The desire to reach representational
accuracy is seen most clearly in standardized tests for children, where children are asked to select
the most appropriate answer to each question. This emphasis on convergent thinking in
standardized testing has become a popular theory among researchers to explain declines in
creativity. For example, Kim (2011) argues that an increase in standardized testing and the
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language used for instructions contributes to declines in creativity because it encourages children
to shift emphasis toward rote learning and memory and away from creative solutions. Sternberg
and O’Hara (1999) agree with Kim, stating that creative students are not benefiting from
instructions given in school because they are focused more on memory and analytical abilities
and less on the more important synthetic abilities of finding multiple solutions. Most notably, in
1968 Torrance hypothesized that the school environment (i.e., value of convergent thoughts over
divergent ones) and the need to pay attention to school rules around fourth grade attributed to the
slumps. Other environmental factors such as parental practices (Mourgues, Barbot, Tan &
Grigorenko, 2014), cultural factors (Dahlman, Backstron, Bohlin, & Frans, 2013) and
experiences (e.g., parental death or poverty; Damian & Simonton, 2015) have been proposed to
contribute to declines in creativity. However, these explanations emphasizing environment’s role
in stressing convergent over divergent thinking have remained largely theoretical without
empirical studies to support them.
Factors that Influence Creativity
Labeling. What is common across the explanations for creative decline is the role that
language can play in communicating a convergent thinking emphasis (e.g., instructions leading
children to think more convergently; Glucksberg & Weisberg, 1966; Kim, 2011). Research on
functional fixedness has, for example, explored how using labels can influence creativity. Taking
the emphasis off a leading label in a functional fixedness task can aid in more creative solutions
to a problem. More specifically, Glucksberg and Weisberg (1966) examined labels in the classic
“candle problem”, in which adults were given a candle, a book of matches, and a box of thumb
tacks and asked to find a way to affix the candle to a wall. In the standard condition, participants
8

were given a picture where the box of tacks was only labeled as “tacks” and the box becomes a
functionally fixed object in that most people do not see it beyond its use of holding the tacks.
Whereas in the label condition participants were given a picture in which the box and the tacks
were labeled separately, and with this additional label participants were more likely to use the
box on its own to achieve the goal of the task to tack the box to the wall to hold the candle
(Glucksberg & Weisberg, 1966). Having a label for each item increased creativity because
people are better able to think about the purpose of each item individually rather than grouping
them together. When grouped together it is harder to think of using the box as anything except
for holding the tacks, whereas when we label them separately it becomes easier to think about
using the box for another purpose.
Work with labels in functional fixedness suggests that the type of label used on
functionally fixed objects can influence performance on divergent thinking creativity tasks.
However, this work has been conducted primarily with adults and within the realm of a
functional fixedness task. Research with children show that children become more susceptible to
functional fixedness as they age. Children as young as 6 and 7 years old have been shown to
struggle with functional fixedness, whereas younger children aged 5 years seem to be immune to
the phenomenon (German & Defeyter, 2000). It is possible that these young children are immune
to functional fixedness because they have learned that items can have multiple labels (Waxman
& Hatch, 1992), but have not yet become overly concerned with finding an appropriate label
accepted by their teachers or parents (Kim, 2011). Therefore, school-age children may be able to
understand multiple labels for objects, but are more likely to search for the most appropriate
label that other peers, parents or teachers want them to use. Work points to the hypothesis that
9

one of the reasons children may begin to show a slump in school age is that they are given labels
that promote convergent thinking as well as being taught to be aware of what labels are valued
by teachers and peers (i.e., when asked to name an object the student knows the teacher prefers
the label “brick”, this label then colors their interpretations of what you can do with that item,
such as using it only as a “brick” and not as a “chair”). Thus, examining labels within a divergent
thinking creativity task could be useful because labels may influence children to respond with
more common uses for an item that they believe the researcher is searching for which may lead
to lower performance on a divergent thinking creativity task. Because children are encouraged to
think more convergently during the school years, these convergent labels may be especially
influential during the fourth-grade slump (Charles & Runco, 2001; Kim, 2011). For example,
recall that in divergent thinking tasks a child must come up with as many novel uses for an item
as they can (e.g., a brick). Language theories would suggest that the label provided in this task
will influence the way children solve this problem by bringing their attention to what the label
represents (e.g., building a house), and filtering out all other possible alternative uses for the
item, such as a chair (Kim, 2011; Waxman & Hatch, 1992). Therefore, making the labels within
a task more ambiguous by using non-sense words, such as “pelganum” may be particularly
helpful for school-age children leading to less influence of the more appropriate convergent
labels they are used to for an object, such as “brick” when generating multiple novel uses for that
object.
Executive Function. As detailed by Sternberg and Lubart (1995), there are several
cognitive and motivational factors that influence creativity, and these individual difference
factors may also interact with the possible “slumps” we see in creativity across development.
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One possible cognitive process that has been linked to creativity is executive function or EF
(Aziz-Zadeh, Liew, & Dandekar, 2013; White & Shah, 2006; Zabelina, & Robinson, 2010). EF
is the cognitive control processes by which people regulate thoughts and behaviors (Zelazo,
Muller, Frye & Marcovitch, 2003). EF has been proposed to exist in a unity/diversity framework
(Miyake & Friedman, 2012) whereby different component processes are correlated with one
another because they share a common EF related to representing task information to guide
behavior. The first component, inhibition, is the ability to inhibit a prepotent response (e.g.,
delaying a small for a larger reward later). The second component known as cognitive flexibility
is the ability to switch between multiple mental sets or rule sets (e.g., switching between sorting
rules). Lastly, working memory is the ability to hold information in mind while manipulating it
(e.g., repeating a series of number digits backward; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki,
Howerter, & Wager, 2000).
Considerations of EF components may be especially important to understanding
creativity. All three components have been linked to creativity separately in adults. Young adults
who score as highly creative have been found to have lower inhibitory control compared to those
with lower creative ability, perhaps because this lack of inhibition allows them to access a
greater number of stimuli or concepts during processing (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2003;
White & Shah, 2006). Zabelina and Robinson (2010) demonstrated that highly creative young
adults had an unusually high level of flexibility (Zabelina & Robinson, 2010), likely because
they are better able to determine when utilizing automatic processes is beneficial and should not
be interrupted (e.g., congruent trials on a Stroop task where one must say a color word written on
the screen and the color of the ink matches the word written, such as the word “green” written in
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green ink) and when it is better to switch to more consciously controlled system like EF (e.g.,
incongruent trials on a Stroop task where the color word and the color of the ink do not match,
such as the word “green” written in yellow ink; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010). In working
memory research, Aziz-Zadeh, Liew, and Dandekar (2013) demonstrated that divergent thinking
was associated with the prefrontal cortex linked to working memory (Fuster, 2001), suggesting
those with higher working memory do better on divergent thinking tasks because they are better
able to mentally manipulate objects along varying dimensions necessary during divergent
thinking tasks (e.g., mentally rotating three shapes, ‘C’, ‘0’, ‘8’ to form a recognizable object
like a smiley face; Aziz-Zadeh, Liew, & Dandekar, 2013). EF is still developing in school-age
children and thus may influence creativity differently at this age, yet no one has examined EF
effects on creativity in children.
Mindset and Persistence. As with cognitive factors, personality and motivation factors
are also important to creativity because they can help individuals overcome obstacles and persist
through difficult creative tasks. Intrinsic motivation, or motivation that is centered within an
individual, has been shown to be especially important to fostering creativity (Amabile,1985).
Perhaps the most influential work on intrinsic motivational styles belongs to Carol Dweck (2006)
and her two motivational frameworks, or mindsets, that set the stage for the way people view
their abilities. The first is a fixed mindset where a person believes their abilities are static and
cannot be changed (Dweck, 2006). For example, a person may believe they are not good at math
and no amount of studying can improve this ability. A growth mindset, on the other hand, is
someone who believes that they can change their abilities with hard work (Dweck, 2006). In this
instance, a person would seek out difficult math challenges to help them learn and grow and not
12

be discouraged by failures. Individuals with a growth mindset seek out challenges and thrive
when problems become difficult, whereas those with a fixed mindset prefer to tackle problems
that are easy for them to solve (Dweck, 2006). With this in mind, it is hypothesized that
individuals with a growth mindset would persist longer during both convergent thinking
problems and divergent creativity problems that are more difficult and ask them to stretch their
imagination and solve problems in a different way, while those with a fixed mindset would
persist only on easier convergent thinking problems where the solution is quicker to find.
Mindset has been linked to creativity and creative self-concepts as well. Karwowski
(2014) found that a growth mindset was positively associated with creative self-concept (i.e.,
self-efficacy for creativity), and a fixed mindset was negatively related to efficacy when solving
insight problems (i.e., solving a creative problem suddenly in an “aha” like experience) in adults
(Bowden & Beeman, 1998). Susan O’Neill (2011) examined the mindsets of young musicians
and discovered that many had been told they were “gifted” or “talented” repeatedly and
developed a fixed mindset as a result, believing that their musical abilities lied in their static
talent rather than in their hard work. When a growth mindset was fostered, however, these young
musicians took more risks, performed better during concerts, and dealt with setbacks better than
their fixed mindset counterparts. O’Neill’s research is in line with Dweck’s (2007) findings that
verbal praise can hinder a growth mindset, and subsequently achievement, when directed toward
the wrong things. Praise for static abilities, talents, and being “smart” lead to a fixed mindset,
whereas praise for effort and hard work can nurture a growth mindset (Dweck, 2007), suggesting
that mindset, like creativity, may be influenced by labels.
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An important part of the growth mindset that may impact creativity is resilience or
persistence. Generating novel and useful ideas is not always an easy or quick task. Persistence
allows individuals to push through difficulties during the creative process. In a survey of 143
creativity researchers, Dweck (2006) found that the researchers consistently rated the factors of
perseverance and resilience within a growth mindset as the most important factors contributing
to creative achievement. Lucas and Nordgren (2015) provided more information on the role of
persistence in creativity by demonstrating that persistence was a critical component of creative
performance for adults even when people underestimated it. Specifically, in a series of studies,
undergraduate participants were asked how many more responses they would generate on the
Alternative Uses Creativity Task if they were allowed more time. Consistently, people indicated
that they would likely not generate many more ideas if allowed more time even though they did
in fact generate more responses and more creative responses on creativity measures after being
allowed more time than on previous attempts, suggesting that people underestimate the value of
persistence in creative achievement. These results reinforce the idea that persistence may be a
leading factor contributing to creative achievement (Dweck, 2006) by demonstrating that when
one persists through a difficult problem they are able to develop more novel creative solutions to
a problem, even when they do not believe that they will.
The Present Study
Creativity is thought to have a curvilinear pattern of development with several sharp
increases as well as quick declines with the most common decline occurring around the fourthgrade before leveling out in adolescence (Torrance, 1968). Children in first-grade, fourth-grade
and adults were selected to coincide with popular trends in development and slumps in children.
14

Specifically, children in first-grade are thought to be experiencing an increase in creativity
(Barbot, Lubart, & Besancon, 2016; Torrance, 1967), whereas fourth-graders are thought to be
experiencing the most discussed slump (Barbot et al., 2016; Claxton, Pannells & Rhoads, 2005;
Torrance, 1697). Adults are included in this sample for two reasons: (1) developmentally their
creativity should have reached an asymptote after another increase during adolescence and (2)
some studies using labels (Glucksberg & Weisberg, 1966), EF (Aziz-Zadeh, Liew & Dandekar,
2013; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010) persistence (Lucas & Nordgren, 2015) and mindset (Dweck,
2006) were not conducted within developmental psychology and therefore only utilized adult
participants and the current study aims to replicate these results with adults while extending them
to children.
Looking at divergent thinking creativity levels in the Alternative Uses Task, I examined
the possibility of a fourth-grade slump and how individual differences in EF and mindset relate
to creativity across the lifespan. First, I examined the developmental nature of creativity by
hypothesizing that (1) children in first-grade would have the highest divergent thinking scores
when given standard instructions on the Alternative Uses Task (Wallach & Kogen, 1965),
followed by adults, then fourth-graders. Second, I looked at individual difference variables that
contributed to baseline levels of creativity. Cognitive EF processes are thought to aid in
developing creative thought through inhibition (e.g., less inhibition leads to the generation of
more ideas, Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2003; White & Shah, 2006), cognitive flexibility (e.g.,
aid in the ability to switch from one way of thinking to another, Zabelina & Robinson, 2010),
and working memory (e.g., allowing individuals to think about multiple items to come up with
more creative solutions, Aziz-Zadeh, Liew, & Dandekar, 2013). Thus, I hypothesized (2)
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individuals with higher EF factors of cognitive flexibility and working memory would have
higher divergent thinking ability, whereas inhibition would be negatively associated with
divergent thinking across all age groups, but the strongest relationship would be seen in adults.
Lastly, a person’s mindset (e.g., fixed mindset where abilities are static versus growth mindset
where abilities can develop and change) has been shown to be a significant personality variable
important to creativity (Dweck, 2006; Lucas & Nordgren, 2015). Therefore, I hypothesized (3)
individuals with a growth mindset would have higher divergent thinking scores than those with a
fixed mindset across all age groups.
The fourth-grade slump has been theorized to occur due to strict instructions in school
that promote convergent thinking and memory as opposed to divergent thought and creativity. In
the present study, I also examined whether labels influenced children’s creative thought related
to the Alternative Uses Task. More specifically, in the Alternative Uses Task I provided children
with either the typically presented non-ambiguous label hypothesized to encourage more
convergent thinking leading children to the “appropriate” response for an ambiguous looking
object (e.g., a lightbulb used to light a room), or an ambiguous label hypothesized to encourage
less convergent thought (e.g., labeling the same item as a “pelganum” or “blicket” may
encourage an unconventional or at least not prompt a prototypical convergent response). Objects
presented were ambiguous looking so that participants would not be influenced by the look of
the item rather than the label used. Using the different labeling conditions, I hypothesized that
(4) though all age groups would have a slight increase in divergent thinking scores when given
an ambiguous label (i.e., a “pelganum”), children in fourth-grade would benefit most because the
ambiguous label would help fourth-graders overcome the search for the convergent answer and
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allow for creative solutions similar to first-grade levels. Further, I hypothesized that (5) for first
graders, EF (cognitive flexibility and working memory, but not inhibition) would generally help
them with creativity production, but would not depend on the types of labels used (i.e.,
ambiguous or non-ambiguous). However, for fourth-graders and adults, better EF ability would
significantly help individuals become more creative when using a non-ambiguous label and
would only have a slight impact when using an ambiguous label.
Finally, Lucas and Nordgren (2015) found that adults typically undervalue the
effectiveness of persisting through divergent thinking tasks. The current study attempted to
replicate these results demonstrated with adults and determine how children view their
persistence during the divergent thinking task. Specifically, participants completed an
Alternative Uses Task for one minute and then were asked how many more ideas they believed
they could generate if given more time. As in Lucas and Nordgren (2015), individuals who
believed they would generate less ideas were thought to undervalue persistence, whereas
individuals who believed they would generate more ideas overvalued persistence. Looking at
how many ideas participants believed they would generate, I hypothesized that (6) adults would
undervalue their persistence and have higher levels of creativity than they estimated, whereas
children in first- and fourth-grade would either overvalue their persistence or correctly estimate
it. Previous research has demonstrated that children overestimate their abilities when comparing
themselves to others (Butler, 1990), but research on how they view persistence on divergent
thinking creativity tasks has not been done before. Further, (7) it is hypothesized that both
children and adults with a growth mindset would correctly estimate or overvalue their
persistence since they thrive on being given difficult problems where they can work harder for
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longer periods of time, whereas those with a fixed mindset would be more likely to undervalue
persistence.
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II.

METHOD

Participants
Participants were 45 first-graders (M = 7.13, SD = .78; 23 girls and 22 boys), 41 fourthgraders (M = 9.95, SD = .80; 18 girls and 23 boys) and 100 adults (M = 19.05, SD = .89; 68
women, 31 men and 1 declined to state). Three first-graders were removed from analyses due to
both peer interference (i.e., a friend told them to stop playing after receiving prizes) and inflated
persistence scores (i.e., estimating they would generate 1,609 more responses to the divergent
thinking creativity task), resulting in 42 first-graders included in the final sample. Removing
these participants did not significantly change the demographic of the age group (M = 7.13, SD =
.80, 21 girls and 21 boys). Participants were predominately white (first-grade: 83.3% White,
4.8% Hispanic, 11.9% did not state ethnicity; fourth-grade: 39% White, 61% did not state
ethnicity; adults: 70% white, 18% African American 6% Asian/Pacific Islander, 3%
Hispanic/Latino(a), 2% Mixed Race and 1% Indian/Hindu). Children in each age group were
recruited from local schools and from the community in a small town in the Southern United
States. Children received small prizes for participating. Children participated at multiple
locations including: a laboratory on the University campus (32 participants), local elementary
schools (53 participants) and a home visit (1 participant). At each location a child participated in
a quiet room. Adults participated in exchange for course credit in an undergraduate psychology
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course at a medium sized University in the Southern United States. All adults participated in the
same quiet room on the University campus.
Procedure
After obtaining parental consent and verbal assent (children) or signed consent (adults) to
participate in the study, participants completed 3 EF tasks (i.e., Backward Digit Span,
Dimensional Change Card Sort Task, and Delay of Gratification Task), measures of divergent
thinking (i.e., Alternative Uses Task [AUT] baseline, AUT persistence and AUT label), a
mindset questionnaire, and lastly the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence-Vocabulary
measure of verbal IQ. These were presented in a fixed order to equate order effects, common of
individual differences studies (Carlson & Moses, 2001).
Measures
Backward Digit Span (BDS). The backward digit span assessed working memory by
having individuals hold digits in mind while reproducing them backward (Carlson, Moses, &
Breton, 2002). Children were introduced to a puppet named “Leo the lion” who was a silly lion
because he said numbers backward. In the training phase, children were instructed to repeat a
string of two numbers backward (i.e., “if I say 1, 2, Leo would say 2, 1”). Children were then
given two similar training trials in which they were corrected if they were wrong. Children had
to independently answer what Leo would say on two different trials to pass training and move on
to testing trials. If children did not pass the training phase (n=2) the testing phase was skipped,
and children moved on to the next task. In the testing phase, children were presented with three
two-digit trials and asked to produce the numbers backward. Next, the experimenter increased
the digit span to three numbers and the procedure was repeated. The experimenter continued to
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give children three trials at each span before increasing the span by one digit. Testing was
terminated once either the experimenter reached a seven-digit span (n=1) or children gave three
incorrect answers in a row. Adults completed the same training phase and task, but began with a
three-digit span instead of the two digits used for children and without the use of the lion puppet.
Testing was terminated after three incorrect responses in a row. Adults had the opportunity to
reach an eleven-digit span (though the highest digit span reached by any adult in the sample was
nine). The highest digit-span where an individual had at least one correct trial (out of three trials)
was measured.
Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS). This task measured cognitive flexibility by
having individuals switch between multiple rules while sorting cards by color or shape (Zelazo,
Frye, & Rapus, 1996). Children saw two sorting boxes on the lower edges of a computer screen
consisting of a yellow flower and green car (see Figure 1). Children were then presented with six
pre-switch trials in which they were asked to sort target cards (e.g., a yellow car or green flower)
that appeared in the middle of the screen based on one dimension (e.g., color). Next, children
were presented with six post-switch trials in which they were asked to switch and sort by a new
dimension (e.g., shape). Finally, children were presented with 12 “borders” trials in which they
were asked to sort by both color and shape in random order based on the border around the card
(e.g., if the card had a border they sorted by shape, if not they sorted by color). The number of
correct “borders” trials was measured for cognitive flexibility in children.
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Figure 1. Diagram of the DCCS. Diagram by condition (pre-switch, post-switch, and borders or
switch trials). Adults screen differ in two ways (1) the instructions for condition (i.e., the word
“color” or “shape” for sorting condition) appear between the two boxes on the bottom of the
screen and (2) there are no borders surrounding the test card during switch trials.

Adults completed a similar computer-based task where instructions for each trial (i.e.,
sort by color or shape) was written at the bottom of the computer screen rather than spoken aloud
as in the children’s task. Since instructions appeared at the bottom of the screen before each trial,
there were no borders around each target card for adults. There were 12 pre-switch trials where
participants sorted by one dimension (i.e., color) and 12 post-switch trials where participants
sorted by another dimension (i.e., shape) and 24 “mixed” trials where participants had to switch
between sorting by the two dimensions. The number of correct “mixed” trials was calculated as a
measure of cognitive flexibility.
Delay of Gratification Task (DoG). Inhibitory control was measured by having children
choose whether they preferred to receive a smaller reward at the time of the experiment or a
larger reward once the experiment was over (Prencipe & Zelazo, 2005). A training phase was
used in which the experimenter introduced children to the task by displaying a laminated card
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with pictures of an immediate reward on the left (e.g. one sticker) and a delayed reward on the
right (e.g., eight stickers). The researcher explained that if they chose one sticker now, it would
be placed into a plastic cup that they were able to play with immediately. However, if they chose
eight stickers later, the stickers were placed into an envelope that they could have at the end of
the experiment. The experimenter then demonstrated the task by making a now decision for 1 vs.
1 and a later decision for 1 vs. 8. Once the children were familiar with the process the researcher
displayed one card at a time with the following ratios: 1 reward now vs. 2 later, 1 reward now vs.
4 later and 1 reward now vs. 6 later. The ratios were the same for three types of rewards: stickers,
pennies and erasers. Nine trials were given and the total number of times the child chose to
delay the reward was measured.
Adults completed a different DoG task that used a hypothetical scenario rather than
stickers, pennies and erasers (Romer, Duckworth, Sznitman & Park, 2010). This task was used to
be more relatable for adults than choosing between small rewards offered to children. In this task
participants were asked about a hypothetical scenario in which they completed a job worth $500.
Their employer then asked if they preferred to receive the $500 payment now, or if they would
be interested in receiving $1,000 six months later. Depending on how the participant responded
(either $500 now or $1,000 later) the amount increments changed accordingly. For example, if
they chose $500 now initially, they were next asked if they would still choose to receive the
money now if the job was worth $400, then $300, then $200, then $100. If they originally
accepted the $1,000 later, they were asked if they would still accept the money later if the job
would pay $900, then $800, then $700, then $600 later. The amount at which the participant
decided to change their answer (or the final amount if they never changed their answer) was
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measured on a scale from 0 (always chose to accept the money now) to 9 (always chose to accept
the money later).
Alternative Uses Task. The Alternative Uses Task (AUT) was used to measure
divergent thinking because it has been widely used and is a reliable measure that is thought to be
appropriate in measuring creativity (Houtz & Krug, 1995; Plucker & Renzulli, 1999; Torrance,
1968; Wallach & Kogan, 1965). Three different versions of the AUT were used in this study:
AUT baseline, AUT persistence and AUT label.
AUT Baseline. The baseline version of the AUT followed the classic method used in
Wallach and Kogan (1965) where individuals were given the following instructions:
“In this game, I am going to name an object—any kind of object like a cup or the
floor—and it will be your job to tell me lots of different ways that the object could
be used. Any object can be used in a lot of different ways. For example, think
about a string. What are some of the ways you can think of that you might use a
string?” (The experimenter lets the participant try). “Yes, those are fine. I was
thinking that you could also use the string to attach a fish hook, to jump rope, to
sew with, to hang clothes on, and to pull shades.” (The experimenter varies her
suggestions so as not to duplicate any the child has provided.) “There are lots
more too, and yours were very good examples. I can see that you already
understand how to play this game. So let’s begin now. And remember, think of
different ways you could use the object that I name. Here we go.”

Then individuals were asked to name as many unique uses for each item (i.e., a brick, a
cardboard box, a shoe, and a chair) as they could to get a baseline of their creative ability. These
items were selected after pilot testing with a group of younger children to determine which
objects they would be familiar enough with to generate responses. Participants were given one
minute to respond to each of the four items. Responses were coded based on fluency (number of
items generated), flexibility (number of categories generated) and originality (percentage of
novel responses based on sample). Coding for this task is discussed in detail below.
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AUT Persistence. After the first minute, participants were asked “how many more uses
could you come up with if given more time” to measure the value they place on persistence
(Lucas & Nordgren, 2015). After responding, individuals were given another minute to respond
with as many unique uses for the item as they could. Participants were asked to complete the
AUT baseline measure for one word (i.e., brick) then asked about persistence, then completed
the AUT persistence measure for the same word. Once participants completed all three tasks
(AUT baseline, persistence question, AUT persistence) for the first word, they moved on to the
second (i.e., cardboard box) and so on until they went through all four words.
AUT Label. The label version of the AUT again included instructions where the
individual must name as many unique uses of an item as they can within one minute. Individuals
were given one minute to complete this task to match the first minute allowed in the AUT
baseline measure. Individuals were read the following instructions:
“Ok, just like in the last game, I am going to ask you to come up with as many
ways you can use an object as you can think of. In this game though, I am going
to show you the object and you can look at it while you think.”
However, in this task, half of participants were given instructions using ambiguous labels for
items (i.e., “pelganum”, “bup”, “sharitnim”, and “blicket”), whereas the other half of participants
were given non-ambiguous labels for items (e.g., “dinosaur”, “car”, “bubble wand”, and “light
bulb”). The name of each item was read aloud to each participant (i.e., “this is a
‘pelganum/dinosaur’, how many different ways could you use this ‘pelganum/dinosaur’”).
Participants in both the ambiguous label condition and the non-ambiguous label condition were
shown an object that can be seen to match the description of the non-ambiguous label for each
object but is ambiguous enough that it can be seen as something else if given the ambiguous
25

label (see Figure 2). In this task, participants were shown an object to examine whether answers
to the unique uses were similar or different depending on the label used (i.e., does a person give
the same uses for a “dinosaur” as they do for a “pelganum”). Having a tangible object to
represent the item in both conditions allows for variability to be attributed to the label and not the
object itself. The items were shown in the same order to each participant whether they were
given an ambiguous or a non-ambiguous label to account for ordering effects. If a participant
asked for clarification on what a certain word meant in either condition the experimenter simply
said, “just do the best you can, how many different ways can you use this (label of item)”. Again,
the fluency, flexibility and originality scores were used as three dependent variables for AUT
label.

Figure 2. AUT objects. Objects used in second version of the AUT task. Labels for each object
for both the ambiguous and concrete condition are as follows: (1) “pelganum” or “dinosaur” (2)
“bup” or “car” (3) “sharitnum” or “bubble wand” and (4) “blicket” or “light-bulb

Coding of the AUT. There are four ways to measure divergent thinking on the AUT:
fluency, flexibility, originality and elaboration (the amount of detail that is given during the
response; Wallach & Kogan, 1965). Most researchers do not examine elaboration unless it is a
direct research question (Bijvoet van den Berg & Hoicka, 2014, Hocevar & Michael, 1979,
Hoicka, Bijvoet-van den Berg, Kerr & Carberry, 2013; Runco, 1986), since I was interested in

26

the amount (fluency) and originality of responses more than the detail provided during responses,
the current study only examines fluency, flexibility and originality.
Fluency was calculated for each of the creativity variables in this study: AUT baseline,
AUT persistence and AUT label. Responses (i.e., each alternative use the participant stated) to
the AUT were digitized by researchers using Microsoft Excel. Fluency for each item was
calculated by adding all responses for that item on the AUT. If an item was repeated in exact or
near exact terms such as “build a house” and “build house”, the item was only counted once
(e.g., given a score of “1”) toward fluency so that only unique items were calculated. Items that
were similar, but not exact were counted as separate items. For example, if someone said, “build
a house” and “build a wall” those would be counted as separate items (e.g., give a score of “2”;
Dippo & Kudrowitz, 2013). A total fluency score for each item was measured. Descriptive
information for fluency of all participants can be found in Table 1. Participants were allowed to
skip questions at any point during the procedure. Due to this, there were several points of
missing data during the AUT baseline (first-grade: n=1 for “shoe”, n=2 for “chair”), AUT
persistence (first-grade: n=3 for “shoe” and n=2 for “chair”) and AUT label (first-grade: n=1 for
“bubble-wand” and “lightbulb”; fourth-grade: n=1 for “lightbulb”) where a participant chose to
skip to the next item. All missing data was handled pairwise for fluency, flexibility and
originality.

27

Total
Baseline
Brick
Box
Shoe
Chair
Total
Persistence
Brick
Box
Shoe
Chair
Total
Amb Label
Dinosaur
Car
Bubble
Light
Total
NA Label
Dinosaur
Car
Bubble
Light
Total

First-Grade

Fourth-Grade

Adult

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

M

SD

182
182
181
180
182

5.52
6.16
5.41
5.95
5.74

2.63
2.80
2.71
2.66
2.32

41
41
40
39
41

3.83
4.73
3.78
4.38
4.13

1.97
2.79
1.95
2.10
1.80

41
41
41
41
41

5.83
6.41
5.80
5.71
5.94

3.22
3.38
2.69
2.91
2.69

100
100
100
100
100

6.09
6.65
5.90
6.66
6.33

2.32
2.33
2.74
2.48
2.04

182
182
179
180
182

3.14
3.24
2.68
2.75
2.94

2.47
2.48
2.28
2.11
1.95

41
41
38
39
41

2.80
2.27
1.84
1.85
2.16

2.40
1.55
1.73
1.44
1.24

41
41
41
41
41

4.05
4.37
2.98
3.05
3.61

2.99
3.44
2.81
2.57
2.59

100
100
100
100
100

2.91
3.17
2.88
2.98
2.99

2.18
2.13
2.18
2.04
1.78

90

4.82

2.79

21

3.81

2.58

20

4.35

3.36

49

5.45

2.50

90
89
88
90

4.47
4.22
4.63
4.50

2.34
2.67
2.38
2.33

21
20
20
21

3.57
3.15
3.70
3.48

2.32
2.50
2.13
2.20

20
20
19
20

4.60
4.10
5.11
4.49

2.95
3.31
2.92
2.99

49
49
49
49

4.80
4.71
4.82
4.94

2.01
2.35
2.19
1.97

91

5.32

2.37

19

4.26

2.58

21

5.76

2.57

51

5.53

2.12

91
91
91
91

5.30
5.16
4.91
5.17

2.41
2.34
2.42
2.15

19
19
19
19

4.53
4.74
4.32
4.46

2.44
3.51
3.09
2.68

21
21
21
21

6.19
6.00
5.67
5.91

2.14
3.11
2.54
2.36

51
51
51
51

5.22
4.98
4.82
5.14

2.43
1.95
2.03
1.77

Table 1. AUT Descriptives. Baseline=AUT baseline; Persistence=AUT persistence; Label=AUT
label. Box=Cardboard box; Bubble=bubble-wand; Light=lightbulb, Amb Label = Ambiguous
label condition, NA Label = Non-Ambiguous Label Condition

Flexibility, or the number of categories used, was calculated for the AUT baseline, AUT
persistence and AUT label. Responses were coded into a keyword or keyphrase to categorize
similar answers (Dippo & Kudrowitz, 2013). For example, responses such as “build house” and
“build school” were both given a category keyword of “build” for responses to “brick”, whereas
“throw at someone” and “hit someone” were both given a category keyword of “weapon”. All
keywords generated can be found in Appendix A. Keywords were generated by four separate
researchers based on criteria outlined in Dippo and Kudrowitz (2013). Researchers first worked
separately to generate keywords for each item then all researchers came together to ensure that
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agreement was met on which keyword/keyphrase each response belonged to. If a response had a
two-part answer (e.g., “wash it and drink out of it”) the overall message was used to categorize
the response (e.g., “drinking out of”) to ensure that the flexibility score was not inflated
compared to the fluency score. Once each response for all items (e.g., brick, chair, etc…) had
been given a category keyword/keyphrase the number of categories for each participant were
added together to provide one flexibility score for each item on the AUT per participant. These
scores were then totaled for each item on the AUT baseline (i.e., “brick”, “cardboard box”,
“shoe” and “chair”), on the AUT persistence (i.e., the second set of responses to the same items
as in AUT baseline), and on the AUT label (i.e., “dinosaur/pelganum”, “car/bup”, “bubblewand/sharitnim”, and “light-bulb/blicket”) to be used as the dependent variables (Hocevar &
Michael, 1979; Runco, 1986; Silvia, Winterstein, Willse, Barona, Cram, Hess, et al., 2008).
Cronbach’s alpha measuring internal consistency for flexibility scores on the AUT baseline was
.85, on the AUT persistence was .85, and on the AUT label was .87.
Originality, or the uniqueness of each response, was then coded by the primary researcher
for each of the dependent variables. After providing each response with a category keyword,
each keyword was entered alphabetically into a spreadsheet. Every individual response from
each participant, across all age groups, was then entered under its corresponding category
keyword to assess originality. Repeated responses between participants were only entered once
and participant numbers were entered next to each response to calculate how many participants
gave each response. For example, 62 participants across all age groups stated that you could
“build a house” with a “brick”. Following divergent thinking coding scheme for originality by
Hoicka, Bijvoet-van den Berg, Kerr & Carberry (2013), responses that were made by less than
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5% of participants across all age groups received a score of “3”, responses by 6-20% of
participants received a score of “2”, responses given by 21-50% of participants was given a score
of “1” and responses made by over 50% of participants was given a score of “0”. Several
answers were given that were merely a description of the item (e.g., “it’s black” or “it has
edges”). These answers were given a score of “0” for originality since they did not list an actual
use of the item across all age groups. Originality scores were averaged for one originality score
for AUT baseline, AUT persistence and AUT label per participant. Cronbach’s alpha measuring
internal consistency among originality scores for the AUT baseline was .51, for the AUT
persistence was .44, and for the AUT label was .52.
Mindset Questionnaire. An 8-item questionnaire was used to assess individuals’
mindset (Dweck, 2006). The mindset questionnaire consisted of 4 items related to a fixed
mindset (i.e., “you can always learn things, but you can’t really change how smart you are”) and
4 items to assess a growth mindset (i.e., “you can always change your talent a good amount, no
matter how much you have”). Four items used a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “disagree
big time” to 6 “agree big time” and the other four items used a 6-point Likert scale ranging from
1 “agree big time” to 6 “disagree big time”. Adults completed the same questionnaire as
children but used different Likert anchors ranging from 1 “disagree a lot” to 6 “agree a lot” in
order to use more adult language. Internal reliability for the Mindset Questionnaire was 0.56. A
total score was calculated for mindset by summing all responses together. Higher scores
indicated more of a growth mindset and lower scores indicated more of a fixed mindset.
Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence- Vocabulary (WASI-Vocabulary).
During the AUT we examined whether the use of an ambiguous or non-ambiguous label would
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influence the creative output for children and adults. Since this study is verbal in nature through
the use of labels and determining if EF contributed to creativity above and beyond language, the
vocabulary section of the Wechsler Abbreviated Intelligence Scale (WASI; Ricketts, Nation &
Bishop, 2007) was used to account for vocabulary ability. The WASI was created to use for
adults and children ages six and up. Participants were instructed to state the meaning of a word
after it was read aloud to them. The task was terminated after either three consecutive incorrect
responses or reaching the maximum number of words; 28 words for adults, 22 words for
children. For each item the participant was able to score either 2 points when demonstrating clear
understanding of the word; 1 point when demonstrating vague understanding of the word; or 0
points if they did not know the word or provided an incorrect answer. A total raw score was used
to assess vocabulary where higher scores indicated better vocabulary understanding.
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III.

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics, Transformations, Outlier Analysis, and Missing Data
Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 2. There were two variables that were further
subjected to transformations and outlier removal. The adult version of the DCCS produced
negatively skewed data (skewness=-2.91 and kurtosis=9.27). Following guidelines from
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) and Howell (2007) a log transformation was conducted on the data
with a reflective component (NEWvariable = log10(k-x) where k = constant from which a new
score is subtracted so the smallest score is 1 which is usually equal to the largest score plus 1).
This transformation of cognitive flexibility in adults is reported and used in analyses (new
skewness= 0.80, kurtosis=.44). For AUT persistence, a difference score was calculated to
determine whether participants overvalued, undervalued or correctly estimated their persistence
on the AUT task. Box plot analyses indicated there were two positive outliers that fell above
2.194 (Q3 + 2.0 * interquartile range) and four negative outliers that fell below -2.043 (Q1 – 2.0
* interquartile range; Sheskin, 2004). These six cases were removed from analyses. Several tasks
included missing data. The BDS had two cases of missing data for children who did not pass the
training phase. The Mindset questionnaire, persistence, and the AUT creativity task each had
four cases of missing data where children decided to stop testing before reaching the task. The
WASI-Vocabulary task included four cases where children decided to stop the session before
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reaching the task and one case where a parent picked a child up early and the child was unable to
complete the task to receive a total score. All missing data was handled pairwise.

Age
EF Variables
BDS
DCCS
DoG
Vocabulary
Mindset
Fluency
Baseline
Persistence
Label
Ambig
Non-Am
Flexibility
Baseline
Persistence
Label
Ambig
Non-Am
Originality
Baseline
Persistence
Label
Ambig
Non-Am
Persistence

N
42

First Grade
Range
M(SD)
5.22-8.84
7.13(.80)

N
41

Fourth Grade
Range
M(SD)
8.66-12.01
9.96(.79)

Adult
N
100

Range
18-22

M(SD)
19.05(.89)

42
0-5
3.12(.97)
40
3-7
4.16(1.09)
42
3-12
7.74(.26)
41
5-12
9.47(2.22)
42
0-9
6.52(2.71) 41
2-9
6.54(2.10)
38
0-28
13.39(7.10) 40
6-37
23.58(7.06)
40 8.00-43.00 23.78(8.87) 41 10.00-29.00 22.37(4.51)

100
3-9
5.60(1.10)
100
10-24
22.21(2.68)
100
0-9
5.46(2.28)
100
7-43
29.85(6.94)
98 15.00-33.00 24.43(3.86)

41
41

.67-8.75
.00-4.75

4.13(1.80)
2.16(1.24)

41
41

1.00-12.75
.00-10.50

5.94(2.69)
3.61(2.59)

100
100

2.00-12.75
.00-8.50

6.33(2.04)
2.99(1.78)

21
.00-7.25
19 1.00-12.50

3.48(2.20)
4.46(2.70)

20
21

.75-13.00
2.75-11.25

4.49(2.99)
5.90(2.36)

49
51

2.25-12.50
1.25-11.25

4.94(1.97)
5.14(1.77)

41
41

.50-5.00
.00-3.75

2.76(1.06)
1.68(.97)

41
41

1.00-7.50
.00-6.00

4.07(1.60)
2.50(1.54)

100
100

1.75-8.25
.00-6.75

4.78(1.30)
2.37(1.31)

21
21

.00-5.00
1.00-5.50

2.58(1.35)
2.88(1.35)

20
21

.75-9.50
1.50-8.50

3.26(2.05)
4.18(1.73)

49
51

2.00-7.25
1.25-7.50

3.80(1.18)
3.79(1.25)

41
41

.00-2.31
.00-3.00

1.49(.44)
1.72(.64)

41
41

.54-2.28
.00-2.75

1.68(.41)
1.92(.64)

100
100

.63-2.39
.00-6.58

1.56(.30)
1.90(.76)

21
19
41

.00-2.66
.25-2.69
.00-16.00

1.79(.64)
1.65(.70)
3.80(4.18)

20
21
41

1.00-2.75
1.32-2.60
.00-62.00

1.92(.51)
49
2.10(.33)
51
6.78(10.42) 100

1.39-2.55
.75-2.44
.00-49.00

2.02(.25)
1.91(.32)
6.71(7.21)

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics. BDS = Backward Digit Span (Working Memory), DCCS =
Dimension Change Card Sort (Cognitive Flexibility), DoG = Delay of Gratification Task
(Inhibition); Ambig = Ambiguous labeling condition, Non-Am = Non-ambiguous labeling
condition.
There were low to moderate correlations between different components of EF, see Table
3A and 3B (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000). Only the BDS and DCCS were correlated in children, r =
.39, p < .001 and DoG task and DCCS were negatively correlated in adults, r = -.21, p = .03.
These results paired with the increasing divergence in later childhood (Lehto, Juujarvi, Kooistra
& Pulkkinen, 2003) and my hypotheses of differential contributions to creativity (e.g., positive
correlations with WM, measured by BDS, and cognitive flexibility, measured by DCCS, and
negative correlations with inhibition, measured by DoG) led me to examine the three EF
components separately in the analyses. Correlations between baseline creativity (i.e., fluency
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flexibility and originality) and age, mindset, WASI-Vocabulary, and EF performance in the BDS
(i.e., WM), DCCS (i.e., cognitive flexibility) and DoG task (i.e., inhibition) are presented in table
3A and 3B and reveal a different relationship for children compared to for adults. For children,
those who performed better on the BDS (i.e., higher working memory) showed better fluency
and flexibility on the AUT, while those who performed better on the DCCS (i.e., better cognitive
flexibility) had higher flexibility scores on the AUT. Age was also related to fluency, flexibility
and originality on the AUT, such that children performed better on each as they age. However,
for adults, those who performed well on the DCCS (i.e., higher cognitive flexibility) actually
showed worse flexibility and originality on the AUT, while those who did well on the DoG task
(i.e., better inhibition) performed better on flexibility on the AUT. Children and adults showed a
similar trend in vocabulary and creativity. Children who performed better on the WASIVocabulary task performed better on fluency, flexibility and originality on the AUT. While
adults who performed better on the WASI-Vocabulary task had higher scores on flexibility and
originality on the AUT.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. Age
2. BDS
.51**
3. DCCS
.31** .39**
4. DoG
.02
-.09
-.05
5. Mindset
-.01
-.18
.09
.03
6. WASI-Vocabulary .50** .57** .39** -.04 -.21
7. Fluency Baseline
.43** .40** .16
.01 -.08 .43**
8. Flexibility Baseline .51** .47** .27* -.03 -.05 .57** .87**
9. Originality Baseline .30** .12
.03
.13 .19 .24* .58** .54**
Table 3A. Bivariate correlations for children BDS = Backward Digit Span (Working Memory),
DCCS = Dimension Change Card Sort (Cognitive Flexibility), DoG = Delay of Gratification
Task (Inhibition)

34

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1. Age
2. BDS
.26**
3. DCCS
-.05
.-.12
4. DoG
.01
-.05 -.21*
5. Mindset
-.01
-.08 .08
.04
6. WASI-Vocabulary .10
.04 -.21* .23* -.07
7. Fluency Baseline
.02
-.02 -.13 .19 -.08 .19
8. Flexibility Baseline -.09
-.01 -.21* .25* -.01 .24* .78**
9. Originality Baseline -.01
.05 -.23* .14 .14 .25* .70** .73**
Table 3B. Bivariate correlations for adults. BDS = Backward Digit Span (Working Memory),
DCCS = Dimension Change Card Sort (Cognitive Flexibility), DoG = Delay of Gratification
Task (Inhibition)
Influence of Age on Baseline Divergent Thinking
A one-way ANOVA was used to test the first hypothesis that a significant slump in
divergent thinking creativity would occur in fourth-graders while first-graders and adults would
have higher divergent thinking creativity scores. This hypothesis was not supported as there was
no significant fourth-grade slump, but rather divergent thinking scores appeared to increase with
age, see Figures 3A-C. There was a significant effect of age on fluency at baseline, F(2, 181) =
15.33, p < .001, η2 = .15. Tukey’s post-hoc analyses revealed that fourth-graders showed better
fluency than first-graders, p = .001 and adults showed better fluency than first-graders, p < .001,
see Figure 3A. There was also a significant effect of age on flexibility at baseline, F(2, 181) =
34.14, p < .001, η2 = .28. Again, Tukey’s post-hoc analyses revealed that fourth-graders
performed better than first-graders, p < .001, and adults performed better than first-graders, p <
.001. Adults also performed better than fourth-graders, p = .01, see Figure 3B. Finally, a
marginally significant effect of age was found on originality at baseline as well, F(2, 181), =
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2.76, p = .07, η2 = .03. Originality at baseline appears to follow a u-shape pattern where fourthgraders marginally perform better than first-graders, p = .06. Fourth-graders also appear to
perform better than adults, though this effect is not significant, p = .19, see Figure 3C.

Fluency AUT Baseline

**
***

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1st Grade

4th Grade
Age Group

Adults

Figure 3A. Age and Fluency. Mean fluency on AUT baseline for first-graders, fourth-graders and
adults. **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Flexibility AUT Baseline

***
6
5

**
***

4
3
2
1
0
1st Grade

4th Grade
Age Group

Adult

Figure 3B. Age and Flexibility. Mean flexibility scores on the AUT Baseline for first-grade,
fourth-grade and adult. **p<.01, ***p<.001.
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Originality AUT BASeline

2
1.9
1.8
1.7
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1

p = .06

1st Grade

4th Grade
Age Group

Adult

Figure 3C. Age and Originality. Mean originality scores on AUT baseline for first-graders,
fourth-graders and adults. Results for originality were not significantly different across age
groups.
Relative Contribution of Cognitive and Motivation Factors on Baseline Divergent Thinking
To examine the relative influence of EF and mindset on baseline creativity scores I ran a
separate multivariate GLM for children (first-graders and fourth-graders) and adults with
Divergent Thinking (DT) scores for fluency, flexibility and originality on the AUT entered as
dependent variables and age (categorical for children, either first- or fourth-grade), the three EF
variables (BDS, DCCS, and DoG task), mindset, and vocabulary as predictor variables1.

1

Analyses were also run with children and adults in the same analysis by calculating z-scores on the raw EF scores
to account for the different measures (i.e., z-scores calculated for children and adults). A multivariate GLM with
fluency, flexibility and originality on the AUT baseline as dependent variables and age, z-score for BDS, DCCS and
DoG, vocabulary and mindset were entered as predictor variables. Interactions between age and EF, age and mindset
and age and vocabulary were also explored. BDS was significantly related to DT, F(1,171) = 3.64, p = .01; Wilk's Λ
= .93, partial η2 =.06, where there was a marginally significant effect demonstrating that those with better working
memory had better originality scores, F(1,171) = 2.97, p = .09. Vocabulary also was significantly related to DT,
F(1,171) = 3.66, p = .01; Wilk's Λ = .99, partial η2 = .01, where higher vocabulary related to higher fluency,
F(1,171) = 4.36, p = .04, higher flexibility F(1, 171) = 8.36, p = .004, and higher originality, F(1, 171) = 8.76, p =
.004. All other variables were not related to DT baseline scores and there were no significant age interactions, all
F’s(1,171) < 3.34, p’s > .07, Wilk's Λ > .92, partial η2 > .01. Since patterns of results were similar when adults and
children were in the same analysis and we did not find evidenced of a 4th grade slump—which is why adults were
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Interactions between age and EF, age and mindset and age and vocabulary were also explored.
For children, only BDS was significantly related to DT scores F(1, 73) = 2.88, p = .04 Wilk's Λ =
.87, partial η2 = .13. Follow up analyses revealed a marginally significant effect of the BDS,
with higher working memory performance on this task relating to greater originality in DT
responses, F(1,73) = 2.70, p = .09. DT scores were not significantly related to DCCS (i.e.,
cognitive flexibility), F(1, 73) = 0.32, p = .82, Wilk's Λ = .99, partial η2 = .02, or DoG (i.e.,
inhibition) F(1, 73) = 0.10, p = .97, Wilk's Λ = .99, partial η2 = .01. Further, mindset was not
related to DT scores, F(1, 73) = 0.06, p = .98, Wilk's Λ = .99, partial η2 = .01, and vocabulary
was marginally related to DT in children, F(1, 73) = 2.39, p = .08, Wilk's Λ = .89, partial η2 =
.11, where children who performed better on vocabulary had higher flexibility on the AUT, F(1,
73) = 5.56, p = .02, and higher originality on the AUT, F(1, 73) = 4.61, p = .03.
For adults, none of the individual difference variables related to DT scores. For EF, there
were no significant relationships between DT scores and either BDS, F(1, 97) = 1.70, p = .18,
Wilk's Λ = .94, partial η2 = .06, DCCS, F(1, 97) = 0.86, p = .47, Wilk's Λ = .97, partial η2 = .03,
or DoG, F(1, 97) = 1.37, p = .26, Wilk's Λ = .95, partial η2 = .05. Further, there was also no
relationship between mindset and DT, F(1, 97) = 0.63, p = .60, Wilk's Λ = .98, partial η2 = .02, or
vocabulary and DT, F(1, 97) = .65, p = .59, Wilk's Λ = .98, partial η2 = .02.

included in the first place, I presented adults and children in separate analyses so that I could better examine how
raw scores in the slightly different EF measures given at each age related to creativity for children and adults.
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Contribution of Labeling and EF to Divergent Thinking
A multivariate general linear model with fluency, flexibility and originality for the AUT
Label entered as dependent variables and age group (categorical: first-grade, fourth-grade and
adult) and condition (ambiguous or non-ambiguous label) as predictors was conducted to test
whether there was a relationship between labeling condition and DT. An age by condition
interaction was also explored. There was a significant main effect of labeling, F(1, 180) =
4.35, p = .006; Wilk's Λ = .93, partial η2 = .07, demonstrating an influence of labels on DT in the
opposite direction than predicted. Specifically, those in the non-ambiguous condition had higher
fluency generating significantly more ideas than those in the ambiguous condition F(1,180) =
5.84, p = .02, see Figure 4. A main effect of age group was also found, F(1,180) = 4.74, p < .001,
Wilk's Λ = .85, partial η2 = .08. Tukey’s post-hoc analysis demonstrated a significant difference
between first- and fourth-graders and between first-graders and adults, p’s < .03, but no
difference between fourth-graders and adults, p’s > .90 on fluency, flexibility and originality,
again demonstrating a lack of a fourth-grade slump. There was no significant interaction between
age and labeling condition on DT scores, F(1,180) = 1.23, p = .296, Wilk's Λ = .96, partial η2 =
.02, suggesting that that fourth graders did not benefit more from the ambiguous label and
instead all ages benefited from the non-ambiguous label equally.
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Average Fluency

6
5
4
3
2
1
0

*

Ambiguous
Non-Ambiguous
Labeling Condition
Figure 4. Fluency and Labeling Condition. Those in the non-ambiguous condition generated
more responses (higher fluency) on the AUT than those in the ambiguous condition. *p < .05.

I ran two separate multivariate GLM’s, one for children and one for adults, to test
whether higher EF would help DT scores particularly in the ambiguous condition2. For children,
fluency, flexibility and originality on the AUT Label were entered as dependent variables with
age category (first-grade or fourth-grade), condition, and the three EF variables, BDS, DCCS,
and DoG task as predictors. Two-way interactions of age by condition and EF by condition were
explored along with three-way interactions between age, EF and condition. For children, main
effects were not found for age, condition, DCCS or DoG task, all F’s(1,79) < 1.04, p’s > .38,
Wilk's Λ > .89, partial η2 > .01. There was a marginal effect for BDS, F(1,79) = 2.52, p = .06,

2

Analyses were also run using all age groups and z-scores for the EF variables as was done for baseline creativity
scores. The results mirrored the ones found when examining children and adults separately with neither working
memory, F (1,179) = .1.63, p = .18; Wilk's Λ = .97, partial η2 = .03, cognitive flexibility, F (1,179) = .29, p = .83;
Wilk's Λ = .10, partial η2 = .01, nor inhibition, F (1,179) = .90, p = .44; Wilk's Λ = .98, partial η2 = .02, were related
to DT in this model. Interactions between labeling condition and age, and condition by EF were not significant.
There were also no significant age interactions, all p’s > .17. Again, given the lack of age interactions I decided to
run adults and children in separate analyses so that I could better examine how raw scores in the different EF
measures given at each age related to creativity for children and adults.
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Wilk's Λ = .96, partial η2 = .11, where children with higher scores on the BDS (i.e., better
working memory) had better originality on the AUT, F(1,79) = 5.48, p = .02, and marginally
better flexibility on the AUT, F(1,79) = 3.66, p = .06. An age by condition interaction was not
significant, F(1,79) = .98, p = .76, Wilk's Λ = .98, partial η2 = .02. Condition by any EF variable
interactions were also not significant, all F’s(1,79) < 1.06, p’s > .37, Wilk's Λ > .95, partial η2 >
.04. Three-way interactions between age, all three EF variables and labeling condition were also
not significant, all F’s(1,79) < 1.67, p’s > .13, Wilk's Λ > .85, partial η2 > .02.
In the GLM for adults, I entered fluency, flexibility and originality on the AUT Label as
dependent variables with condition, and the three EF variables, BDS, DCCS, and DoG task, as
predictors. Two-way interactions of condition and EF variables were explored. Main effects were
not found for condition, or for any of the EF variables, all F’s(1,97) < 1.03, p’s > .38, Wilk's Λ >
.97, partial η2 > .001. Interactions between condition and all EF variables were not significant,
all F’s(1,97) < 2.40, p’s > .19, Wilk's Λ > .98, partial η2 > .02. Three-way interactions between
age, all three EF variables and labeling condition were also not significant, all F’s(1,79) < 1.92,
p’s > .09, Wilk's Λ > .97, partial η2 > .02.
Persistence, Mindset and Divergent Thinking
Difference scores were calculated for the dependent variable of fluency on the AUT after
being asked to persist, where the actual total number of responses generated by the participant
during their second attempt at answering was subtracted from the number of items the participant
expected to generate. Higher scores indicated that a participant overvalued their persistence (i.e.,
expected to generate more responses than they actually did when given the opportunity to
persist), lower scores indicate that they undervalued their persistence (i.e., expected to generate
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fewer responses than they actually did) and a score of zero indicated that the participant correctly
estimated how many responses they would generate when given more time. Only fluency was
used to calculate this dependent variable since persistence relates more to the number of ideas
one can generate than it does to either the number of categories (flexibility) or how unique their
responses would be (originality). The difference score was entered as the dependent variable
with age (categorical either first-grade, fourth-grade or adult), mindset and an age by mindset
interaction entered as predictors in the model.
A univariate GLM was used to examine whether adults and children show different
patterns in their value of persistence and whether individuals with a growth mindset would be
less likely to undervalue their persistence. Difference scores for persistence were entered as the
dependent variable with age category and mindset entered as independent variables. An age by
mindset interaction was also explored. There was no main effect for age, F(2,172) = 1.50, p =
.23, suggesting that there was no difference in how children and adults valued persistence in a
divergent thinking task . There was also no main effect for mindset, F(1,172) = .59, p = .45,
suggesting that there was no difference for those with a growth or fixed mindset on the value of
persistence in a divergent thinking task. An age by mindset interaction was also not significant,
F(2,172) = 2.08, p = .13, which also failed to provide evidence for differences in how children
and adults with a growth mindset versus a fixed mindset value their persistence on a divergent
thinking task. Since age was not a significant predictor of value of persistence, I conducted a one
sample t-test to determine whether people across all age groups undervalued, overvalued, or
correctly estimated their persistence on the AUT. Across all age groups, people tend to
undervalue their persistence, t(181) = 10.78, p < .001. Specifically, people estimate on average
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they will produce about one and a half more responses (M = 1.52, SD = 1.90) and actually
produce approximately three more responses (M = 2.94, SD = 1.95) when given more time, see

Mean Score

Figure 5.
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0

***

Expected Persistence Actual Performance
Figure 5. Persistence and Creativity. Mean scores for expected performance (i.e., number of
items participants believed they would generate) compared to actual performance (i.e., number
of items they actually generated when given more time). ***p < .001.
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IV.

DISCUSSION

The current study aimed to confirm a significant slump in creativity around fourth-grade
and examine whether EF, labeling and mindset contributed to creativity across the lifespan. A
slump in creativity was not found, rather, divergent thinking creativity scores tended to increase
from first-grade to adulthood. In the present study, EF was more strongly related to creativity for
children than for adults. Better EF and vocabulary were related to higher creativity scores for
children, and when considered together, working memory emerged as the strongest predictor of
originality. This same trend did not occur for adults, where EF was not a significant predictor of
creativity and though vocabulary was positively correlated with flexibility and originality in
adults, it was not a successful concurrent predictor of creative ability when considered together
with other factors. When examining whether using an ambiguous label would aid in creativity
over using a non-ambiguous label, surprisingly the use of the non-ambiguous label was more
beneficial to fluency for all ages. Finally, growth mindset did not lead to more divergent thinking
creativity scores in either children or adults. All age groups undervalued their persistence on a
divergent thinking creativity task and this was not related to their mindset. The results of this
study demonstrate that creativity increases as individuals age and is influenced by the type of
label used during a creative task (i.e., non-ambiguous label), persistence (i.e., although people
tend to undervalue persistence in a creative task, persistence does generally lead to more creative
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responses), and EF (i.e., working memory aids in better originality for children, but not for
adults).
Development of Creativity
Contrary to prior reports speculating a slump in creativity in the fourth-grade (Torrance,
1967; 1968), in the present study fluency and flexibility in creativity increased with age from
first-grade to fourth-grade until adulthood. There are several possible reasons for these linear
creativity increases with age. First, these findings are consistent with research showing that
relative “slumps” and “peaks” in creativity show inconsistency across research as to what age
they occur (Barbot, Lubart & Besancon, 2016; Charles & Runco, 2001; Kim, 2011). For
example, Charles and Runco (2001) found a peak in creativity at fourth-grade rather than a
slump, and Kim (2011) and Lau and Cheung (2010) did not find a fourth-grade slump, but rather
slumps in sixth- or seventh-grade. Though the current study found a linear relationship
demonstrating creativity improves with age, I only examined creativity in first-grade, fourthgrade and adulthood, limiting the ability to detect slumps in creativity in other age groups. Thus,
it is possible that a significant slump in creativity may exist at another age group (e.g., a slump
existing in the sixth-grade, Kim, 2011).
Second, the different tasks used in studies about the development of creativity may
explain the variations in the timing of slumps (Barbot, Lubart & Besancon, 2016). Though I used
the most widely used measure of creativity in the literature, the AUT (a portion of the Torrance
Test of Creative Thinking which were used to establish the fourth-grade slump; Torrance, 1968),
studies examining the development of creativity have utilized other measures. For example,
Claxton, Pannels and Rhoads (2005) who found a slight increase in DT scores from fourth- to
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ninth- grade utilized the Creativity Assessment Packet for measures of divergent thinking and
divergent feeling; a peak in fourth-grade found by Charles and Runco (2001) used the two
instances task where participants were asked to name instances of round things and things that
make noise; and Kim (2011) used the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking to find a slump in
sixth-grade. Several studies that have administered multiple creativity tasks have outlined
different developmental trajectories for each task (Barbot, Lubart & Besancon, 2016; Claxton et
al., 2005; Torrance, 1968), demonstrating that the specific task used may measure creative
potential in slightly different ways.
These differences between tasks are likely due to each task targeting a specific facet of
creativity (i.e., divergent thinking: many solutions to a single problem such as the uses for a
brick, or convergent thinking: one solution to a problem such as finding a way to make a
pendulum swing using only one item) while creativity is more than just the sum of its parts and
needs to be considered as a whole where convergent and divergent thinking work together . My
finding of a linear increase in creativity when using the AUT adds to the developmental
creativity literature and suggests that creativity might increase as people age rather than be
marked by specific slumps throughout development. However, the fact that patterns of creativity
are so variable and depend heavily on the type of task used suggests that more work is needed in
this area. Using different measures of creativity that include both divergent and convergent
thinking within creativity to assess its development could influence the variations in timings for
slumps as the deficits found may be related to each specific task more than to age. Utilizing
multiple measures of creativity using different facets of creativity would allow research on its
development to determine whether trends in development (i.e, slumps in creativity) are relegated
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to individual facets of creativity and help parse out the trajectory of its development more
completely.
Contribution of EF and Vocabulary to Divergent Thinking
Another novel finding in this study was related to a possible differential relationship
between EF and creativity in children and adults. Better working memory was associated with
better fluency and flexibility on the AUT in children and better cognitive flexibility was
associated with better flexibility on the AUT in children. When examined together, working
memory was shown to be the strongest predictor of performance on the AUT with better working
memory leading to higher scores for originality on the AUT at baseline and marginally higher
scores for originality and flexibility during the labeling condition. These results support previous
research with adults where both cognitive flexibility (Beaty, Kennett, Christensen, Rosenberg,
Benedek, Chen, et al., 2018; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010) and working memory (Asiz-Zadeh,
Liew, & Dandekar, 2013) are shown to aid in creativity. Better cognitive flexibility is thought to
contribute to creativity by allowing individuals to more easily switch between different
techniques that may or may not be working during a problem-solving task (Zabelina &
Robinson, 2010). The current research extends this finding to children showing that children who
have higher cognitive flexibility perform better on flexibility on the AUT perhaps due to a
greater ability to switch between their ideas during the divergent thinking task. Working
memory, however, appeared to be the strongest predictor of performance on the AUT for
children. This may be due to children having similar ability to adults in being able to mentally
manipulate objects and potential uses for that object necessary for the task (Aziz-Zadeh, Liew, &
Dandekar, 2013).
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However, for adults, EF was not related to divergent thinking creativity either at baseline
or in any labeling condition. These results also appear to be in contrast to previous literature
demonstrating a link between EF and creativity in adults where higher cognitive flexibility was
found among creative individuals (Beaty, Kennett, Christensen, Rosenberg, Benedek, Chen, et
al., 2018; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010), a link between divergent thinking and working memory
locations was found in the prefrontal cortex (Aziz-Zadeh, Liew, & Dandekar, 2013) and lower
inhibition among was found creative individuals (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2003; White &
Shah, 2006). The lack of a EF-creativity link in adults could be more methodological in the
present study. The tasks used to measure EF in adults and in children in the current study were
designed to be as comparable as possible, but also slightly different from one another to make
the tasks more age appropriate (e.g., the delay of gratification task to assess inhibition using
stickers, pennies and erasers for children and using a hypothetical scenario about money for
adults). This may have resulted in EF measures that were too simplistic for our adult sample. In
current adult EF work the ecological validity of EF tests has been called into question. In one
study by Chaytor, Schmitter-Edgecombe and Burr (2006), current most utilized EF tests such as
the Stroop Test and Wisconsin Card Sorting Task only accounted for 18-20 percent of the
variance in everyday executive functioning abilities. When environmental factors were added
(e.g., environmental cognitive load) more of the variance was accounted for suggesting that there
may be other influences on EF ability than the EF tasks can account for alone. Therefore, it is
possible that the EF tests for adults in the current study were not inclusive enough to capture
everyday EF ability in adults leading to the insignificant results.
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Even with attempts to make these tasks more age appropriate, adults in the current study
appeared to reach ceiling on the cognitive flexibility task (e.g., correctly answering all 24 items
on the switch trials of the DCCS) even with using a measure of the DCCS designed for adults.
Though our data was log transformed to account for these ceiling effects it may have contributed
to the differences we see in children and adults. Using reaction times or a measure of cognitive
flexibility that has been shown to not produce high ceiling effects would be beneficial in
affirming these results.
The current study also examined how vocabulary was related to divergent thinking since
the AUT is inherently a verbal task. Better vocabulary ability was positively related to fluency,
flexibility and originality at baseline for children and to flexibility and originality at baseline for
adults. These findings are in support of previous research that has found using mnemonics in an
English as Second Language class has helped increase students’ vocabulary and in turn their
creativity on writing assignments (Pillai, 2017). The AUT requires that people think about
specific uses for an object. Having a better vocabulary relates to this ability in that both children
and adults can find a wider variety of uses for an object (e.g., higher flexibility) when they have
a greater understanding of different types of words and concepts to begin with (e.g., higher
vocabulary). Indeed, higher vocabulary has been linked with better strategies used during
convergent problem-solving tasks (Blanchard-Fields, Chen, & Norris, 1997). The current results
add to the literature by demonstrating that this link between higher vocabulary and better
problem-solving extends into divergent problem-solving tasks such as the AUT for creativity
measurement.
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Contribution of Labeling to Divergent Thinking
Using labels in a functional fixedness task has been shown to influence performance on a
divergent thinking creativity task (Glucksberg & Weisberg, 1966). The current study
hypothesized that using an ambiguous label would further help individuals on a divergent
thinking creativity task as opposed to using a non-ambiguous label because an ambiguous label
would not anchor participants into a functional fixedness problem by responding with only the
most common uses for an object (e.g., building a house for the word “brick”). However, using an
ambiguous label for an object did not help participants think more creatively about uses for that
object. In fact, using a non-ambiguous label actually helped participants generate more creative
uses for an item. It is possible that people of all ages needed to be grounded in some concept of
what an object is in order to determine what it might be useful for. When examining referential
communication in children, Glucksberg, Krauss and Weisberg (1966) used a novel nomenclature
for novel objects to determine whether 3-5- year old children could form representations of novel
words for objects to communicate with others. A child and an experimenter were placed together
to construct a tower of blocks with unfamiliar objects on them. The adult had to communicate
with the child using novel nomenclature for these novel objects so that the child could construct
an identical tower of blocks. In practice trials, children were able to represent the blocks and
share nomenclature for familiar objects of animal faces on the blocks. However, during the
testing phase with novel objects on the blocks, children performed much worse. The study found
that unlike adults, children were unable to form solid representations of the shared nomenclature
for the novel objects. This might suggest that using ambiguous labels of objects, similar to using
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novel nomenclature for objects, may be difficult for young children without some form of
reference, or non-ambiguous label, to help guide them.
Related, work has found that ill-formed representations hinder problem-solving
performance in preschoolers. For example, Miller, Marcovitch, Boseovski and Lewkowicz
(2015) showed that when you provide preschool children with an unfamiliar label (e.g., an
ordinal label of first, second and third, before they know what those concepts mean) it actually
hinders their performance in a spatial search task. The authors suggest the decrease in
performance may be due to the fact that they are establishing an ill-formed representation which
hurts their performance when reflected on to guide behavior. Results from the current study may
extend these findings and suggest that these types of ill-formed representations likely impact
problem-solving in a creative divergent thinking task because children have difficulty forming a
representation of the object presented to them when given an ambiguous label that does not
ground the object in something familiar.
The fact that people perform better with a concrete non-ambiguous label aligns with other
work demonstrating a benefit of concrete labels in convergent tasks as well. When both children
and adults use verbal labels to represent what to do in a specific task, they can overcome
difficulties on that task (Muller, Zelazo, Hood, Leone & Rohrer, 2004). For example, using a
verbal label helps adults in the classic Stroop test where participants must name the color of ink
with mismatching or matching color words (MacLeod, 1991). Stating the condition out loud
(e.g., naming the color of the ink) before responding significantly improved performance for
adults. Similarly, 3-year old children who used a verbal label before of task condition before
responding to a task with a congruent trial (e.g., choosing two cards with the same object on
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them) and an incongruent trial (e.g., selecting two cards with different objects on them)
significantly improved their ability to select the correct situation compared to 3-year old children
who did not verbally label the situation before making a selection (Muller, Zelazo, Hood, Leone
& Rohrer, 2004). Perhaps, using a non-ambiguous label aids in object representation similar to
how a verbal label aids in task representation (MacLeod, 1991; Muller, Zelazo, Hood, Leone &
Rohrer, 2004). That is for both children and adults using a familiar word label (non-ambiguous
label) helps to form a representation of the object allowing for more creative responses for the
object on the AUT. However, in the present study it is not clear whether the ambiguous label is
hurting performance, the concrete label is helping performance, or whether there is a little bit of
both occurring. Future studies should include a condition without labels to better understand how
language influences our thinking during divergent thinking creativity tasks.
Estimation of Persistence on Divergent Thinking Task
Persistence allows individuals to push through difficult tasks and thinking creatively is
often difficult and time consuming. Thus, having a strong belief that persistence will help you
solve creativity tasks is important. However, Lucas and Nordgren (2015) found that adults
undervalued persistence in a creativity task even though persisting often led to more ideas and
more creative ideas. The current study extended these findings to children demonstrating that as
young as first-grade, individuals will begin to undervalue persistence in a creative task. This
appears in contrast to past research showing that children tend to overestimate their abilities
(Butler, 1990). However, past research indicates that children overestimate their abilities when
comparing themselves to others and the current study examines estimation of persistence only in
relation to oneself. Although there are several possibilities for why children estimate their
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abilities differently when comparing themselves to others and to themselves, the Social
Cognitive Career Theory (SCCT; Brown, Tramayne, Hoxha, Telander & Fan, 2008; Lent, Brown
& Hackett, 1994) may shed light on why people of all ages are underestimating their level of
persistence on creativity tasks. In this theory, students who perform well academically do so
based on their ability to form concrete goals based on expectations of an outcome and selfefficacy beliefs that are derived from past performance (e.g., high school GPA) and general
cognitive ability (e.g., SAT or ACT scores). Applied to creativity, it is possible that people are
experiencing poor self-efficacy beliefs and deriving poor outcome expectations (i.e.,
underestimating their persistence on a creative task) due to prior performance on creative tasks
(e.g., having to write a story in class). If people are exposed to creative tasks that do not match
their creative ability, such as being forced to write a story in class when their creative ability is
more apt for taking photographs, they may develop a sense of poor self-efficacy beliefs that lead
them to lower estimation of how much persistence will help.
I believe this mismatch between creative tasks and creative ability starts young when
children are exposed to creative tasks in school and this experience continues throughout the
lifespan as shown in the results of the current study. For example, research on different
pedagogical modalities focusing on either alternative pedagogy that focuses on things such as
creativity (e.g., Montessori schools) or more traditional education techniques found in a typical
public school have shown repeatedly that when focused on creative pedagogy children’s creative
achievement is improved (Avanzini & Ferrero, 1967; Besancon & Lubart, 2008; Frankieweicz,
1984) demonstrating that if children find a match to their creative potential they may increase
their creative ability. Though this research only demonstrates creative ability being improved and
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not creative self-concept or persistence in creativity, if we examined persistence in creative tasks
in an alternative pedagogical environment like a Montessori school versus a more traditional
pedagogical environment differences might emerge.
Mindset and Divergent Thinking
When examining how motivational factors such as mindset, related to divergent thinking
it was found that mindset was not related to divergent thinking creativity in either adults or
children nor was it related to persistence. These results are surprising, as a growth mindset has
been shown to benefit creativity and positively influence creative self-concepts (Bowden &
Beeman, 1998; Karwowski, 2014; O’Neill, 2011). One possibility for the null relationship
between mindset and divergent thinking may relate to the measure of mindset in the present
study. The mindset questionnaire I used was a short eight-item questionnaire generally used to
determine a general growth or fixed mindset that can be used for determining mindset related to
anything, such as mindset about math or about IQ or about life in general (Dweck, 2006).
Though using a questionnaire that could capture mindset in a wider variety of areas was the
initial draw of using the mindset questionnaire, it is possible that using a different questionnaire
that was longer and more appropriate for mindset more specifically related to creativity could
have yielded different results. Specifically, researchers have typically studied growth and fixed
mindsets as a singular term with the two operating at dual ends of a continuum (O’Connor,
Nemeth & Akutsu, 2013). However, Karwowski (2014) used factor analysis and demonstrated
people may hold different mindsets at the same time for different things. For example, a person
may hold a fixed mindset related to solving math problems and a growth mindset related to
solving divergent thinking creativity problems. Our measure treated mindset as a global ability,
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where someone held either a growth or fixed mindset that would be applied to every domain.
Utilizing a mindset measure specific to divergent thinking in future studies would more
accurately demonstrate whether a growth mindset is related to divergent thinking creativity by
capturing how people view their mindset related specifically to creativity.
Another issue with the mindset questionnaire employed in the present study was its fairly
low internal reliability scores. Though this scale has been used in previous studies and found to
have higher reliability than in the current study (Dweck, 2006), this study may have found lower
internal reliability due to combining children and adults in the same study. Dweck (2006)
utilized this questionnaire in multiple studies, but all were conducted with adults finding higher
internal reliability. When examining the internal reliability of the scale in the current sample with
only adults it was found to be higher (i.e., α = .67 as opposed to .56 when children and adults
were included together) and reliability was relatively lower for children (i.e., α = .47). This
demonstrates that in our sample the lower reliability score for children may have caused the
reliability for the mindset questionnaire to be lower than in previous studies limiting our
interpretations of its results. This lower reliability for children may be due to children as young
as first- or fourth-grade may not fully comprehend what the measure is trying to capture. When
utilizing a different mindset measure that examines creativity mindset specifically as mentioned
above, it will be important to use such a measure that is also specifically designed for children to
ensure that all children are understanding the nature of the questions.
Conclusion
The current study contributes our understanding of creativity development in several
important ways. First, it reiterates the unpredictability of the development of creativity showing a
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linear growth in creative ability from first-grade to adulthood. Second, it shows that cognitive
factors like EF differentially contribute to creativity depending on age. For children in first- and
fourth-grade, working memory played a significant role in originality of creative ideas. For
adults, EF did not play a role in creative ability. Third, it demonstrates that non-ambiguous labels
are more effective than ambiguous labels in aiding creative output. Fourth, personality factors
such as mindset may not play a role in creativity. Lastly, all age groups tend to undervalue
persisting through creative tasks. Though this study makes important contributions to the field,
there are some limitations that need to be addressed. First, the study only used one divergent
thinking creativity task, the AUT. Though the AUT is the most widely used divergent thinking
creativity task, it is possible that task characteristics may have contributed to some of our null
findings and using at least one other task could have addressed this. Second, it was found that
non-ambiguous labels aided in creativity more than did ambiguous labels, but more research is
needed to uncover why this phenomenon occurs. Third, our low internal reliability and
continuous measure for mindset may have limited the observance of a relationship between
mindset and creativity. Using a measure related to creative mindsets would help future studies
better parse out this relationship or demonstrate that indeed no relationship exists as was found in
this study. Lastly, though I examined how people evaluated persisting in a creative task, I did not
examine possible reasons for this undervaluation. Future studies should examine the components
of the SCCT in terms of creativity to determine how self-efficacy beliefs and ideas about past
performance/ability may influence people’s perceptions on whether persisting through a difficult
creative task can be beneficial. Taken together, the results of this study demonstrate the
complexity of creativity and its development from first-grade to adulthood.
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APPENDIX A
Brick

Cardboard
Box

Shoe

Chair

Dinosaur/
Pelganum

Bubblewand/
Sharitnum
1. Animal 1. Arts &
1. Arts & 1. Action
1. Arts &
1. Arts &
1. Arts &
2. Arts &
Crafts
Crafts 2. Arts &
Crafts
Crafts
Crafts
Crafts
2. Break
2. Atop
Crafts
2. Atop
2. Atop
2. Atop
3. Atop
3. Build
3. Break 3. Atop
3. Break
3. Break
3. Break
4. Break
4. Burn
4. Build
4. Break
4. Build
4. Build
4. Build
5. Build
5. Bury
5. Burn
5. Build
5. Burn
5. Burn
5. Burn
6. Burn
6. Cover
6. Collect 6. Burn
6. Bury
6. Descrip 6. Descri
7. Bury
7. Descripti 7. Cover 7. Carry
7. Carry
tion
ption
8. Cover
on
8. Damag 8. Climb
8. Descrip 7. Experi
7. Experi
9. Exercis 8. Experime
e
9. Descrip
tion
ment
ment
e
nt
9. Descri
tion
9. Experi
8. Gift
8. Gift
10. Experi
9. Gift
ption
10. Fold
ment
9. Hang
9. Hang
ment
10. Hang
10. Experi 11. Gift
10. Gift
10. Hold
10. Hide
11. Garden 11. Hide
ment
12. Hang
11. Hang
11. Movem 11. Hold
12. Gift
12. Hold
11. Fashio 13. Hide
12. Hold
ent
12. Manip
13. Hang
13. Make
n
14. Movem 13. Manipu 12. Noise
ulate
14. Hold
14. Place
12. Garde
ent
late
13. Place
13. Move
15. Noise
15. Play
n
15. Place
14. Movem 14. Play
ment
16. Place
16. Presentat 13. Gift
16. Play
ent
15. Present 14. Noise
17. Play
ion
14. Hang
17. Present 15. Noise
ation
15. Place
18. Present 17. Prop
15. Hide
ation
16. Place
16. Prop
16. Play
ation
18. Protectio 16. Hold
18. Protecti 17. Play
17. Protecti 17. Poke
19. Prop
n
17. Move
on
18. Prop
on
18. Prop
20. Protecti 19. Recycle
ment
19. Recycle 19. Present 18. Senses 19. Recycl
on
20. Senses
18. Noise 20. Sit
ation
19. Sit
e
21. Senses 21. Shelter
19. Play
21. Stack
20. Protecti 20. Stack
20. Scoop
22. Sit
22. Shipping 20. Prop
22. Stool
on
21. Stand
21. Senses
23. Stack
23. Sit
21. Protect 23. Throw
21. Senses 22. Throw
22. Sit
24. Stand
24. Stack
ion
24. Tool
22. Stack
23. Tool
23. Stand
25. Storage 25. Stand
22. Recycl 25. Usage
23. Stool
24. Transpo 24. Throw
26. Throw 26. Storage
e
26. Weapo 24. Throw
rt
25. Tool
27. Tool
27. Throw
23. Senses
n
25. Tool
25. Trash
26. Trash
28. Usage
28. Tool
24. Sit
27. Wear
26. Trash
26. Usage
27. Usage
29. Weapo 29. Transpor 25. Stack
28. Weight 27. Usage
27. Weapo 28. Weapo
n
tation
26. Storag
28. Weapo
n
n
30. Wear
30. Usage
e
n
28. Wear
29. Wear
31. Weight 31. Weapon 27. Tie
29. Wear
29. Weight 30. Weigh
32. Wear
28. Throw
30. Weight
t
33. Weight
29. Tool
30. Usage
31. Weapo
n
32. Wear
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Car/
Bup

Lightbulb/
Blicket
1. Arts &
Crafts
2. Atop
3. Blow
4. Break
5. Build
6. Burn
7. Cover
8. Descri
ption
9. Experi
ment
10. Fill
11. Gift
12. Hang
13. Hide
14. Hit
15. Hold
16. Idea
17. Kitche
n
18. Light
19. Move
ment
20. Noise
21. Place
22. Play
23. Poke
24. Prop
25. Protec
tion
26. Recycl
e
27. Senses
28. Sit
29. Stand
30. Throw
31. Tool
32. Trash
33. Usage
34. Weapo
n
35. Wear

33. Weight

36. Weigh
t
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